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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 3, 1987, eleven men - the first ministers of Canada
and the ten provinces - shook hands, signed their names and created
the 1987 Constitutional Accord, known more commonly as the Meech
Lake Accord. The official purpose of the exercise was to "patriate"
Quebec. The 1982 amendments to the Constitution had not met Que-
bec's concerns, despite promises by the federal government during the
1980 Referendum campaign that if Quebeckers voted "No" on the
referendum (which they did) they could expect constitutional amend-
ments that would reflect and protect Quebec's historic claims., Quebec
was, of course, legally bound by the provisions of the Constitution
Act, 1982. Because of its exclusion from the latter stages of the 1982
amendment process, however, there was a "strong and quite under-
standable push to bring Quebec into the constitutional family at the
symbolic level".2 The terms of the Accord explicitly recognize Quebec
as a "distinct society", and enhance provincial powers in a number of
areas. In exchange for entrenching the Accord in the Constitution, the
Quebec government would officially consent to inclusion in the 1982
amendments. Thus far, Parliament, the Quebec National Assembly and
the legislatures of every province but Manitoba and New Brunswick
have endorsed entrenching the Accord in the Constitution.
The federal government and many others have portrayed the
Accord as a great achievement, a remedy for the deficiency in the
Constitution created by Quebec's unwillingness to join in the 1982
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patriation exercise. In this essay we will take a more skeptical view.
We will argue that the Meech Lake Accord is undemocratic. In both
the process leading to the Accord and in its substance, the Accord
should cause concern for those who take seriously the idea of demo-
cratic participation in self-government. As we shall see, the process
leading up to the Accord excluded the input of just about everybody
but the first ministers and their advisors. This exclusion is reflected in
the substance of the Accord by its notable absence of recognition or
protection of aboriginal peoples, women and ethnic minorities. After
discussing these forms of exclusionary constitutional politics, we will
argue that Quebec's inclusion in the Constitution through the "distinct
society" clause would not necessarily have the effect of protecting or
promoting Quebec's cultural and linguistic autonomy and might func-
tion to delegitimate and defuse popular and political struggles for such
autonomy. Thus, our skepticism about the "distinct society" clauses
does not endorse the view often expressed outside Quebec that the
clause provides Quebec too much cultural and linguistic autonomy.
Rather, we are concerned it does not provide enough.
While debate was conspicuously absent from the process leading
up to the Accord, there was much discussion in its wake. In this essay
we will attempt to develop our concerns about the Meech Lake Accord
through analysis and review of five recent books on the topic. Schwartz's
FATHOMING MEECH LAKE3 is an analytical, critical and comprehensive
study of the Accord; Hogg's MEECH LAKE CONSTITUTIONAL AccORD4
is a section by section annotation of the Accord; COMPETING CONSTI-
TUTIONAL VISIONS, 5 PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WEST6 and L'ADHESION
DU QUEBEC A L'AccORD DU LAC MEECH 7 are each a collection of
papers presented at academic conferences on the Accord. Among all
the books, the various topics that have been the subject of debate
about the Accord are covered: the democratic process, the distinct
society clause, human rights, aboriginal peoples, Senate reform, the
Supreme Court of Canada, the spending power, visions of federalism,
the amending formula and immigration. We will focus on the treatment
of the first four of these in the books under review.
II. MEECH LAKE AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Political analysts have long been aware of the disjuncture between
the democratic ideal of citizen participation in political decision-making
3 B. Schwartz, FATHOMING MEECH LAKE (Winnipeg: Legal Research Institute
of the University of Manitoba, 1987).
4 P. Hogg, MEECH LAKE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD ANNOTATED (Toronto: Car-
swell, 1988).
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(Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1988).
7 R.-A. Forest, ed., L'ADHESION DU QUEBEC A L'ACCORD DU LAC MEECH
(Montreal: Les Editions Th6mis Inc., 1988).
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and the actual operations of "democratic" institutions.8 Recent devel-
opments in the political institutional structures of western democratic
states have been analyzed by commentators as widening this gap.
There is a trend towards more powerful executives and bureaucracies,
and a corresponding disempowerment of legislative assemblies, which
functions to restrict the already limited scope for citizen participation
in government. 9 In Canadian political thought, this point has been
made in relation to "executive federalism",O and in discussions of
judicial review under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I The Meech
Lake Accord is a part of this trend and should cause those committed
to the ideal of democratic participation great concern. With regard to
political process, the Accord challenges the democratic ideal in two
related ways. First, the process leading up to the Accord was elitist,
secretive and exclusionary, representing the worst aspects of executive
federalism; and second, the Accord strengthens the institution of ex-
ecutive federalism by entrenching First Ministers' Conferences in the
Constitution. We will examine these in turn.
A. The Meech Lake Process
Most commentators who discuss the process leading up to the
Meech Lake Accord agree that it was a sorry affair from the standpoint
of democratic principles. 2 They emphasize the haste, secrecy and
elitism of the process,13 and argue that it is anathema to democratic
principles "to let eleven men (because it was ultimately eleven men)"14
- operating in "a secretive, masculine air"5 - construct a "consti-
tutional machinery [that will] mold the behaviour of unborn genera-
tions". 16 As Cairns points out, "women, aboriginals, social policy
' See, e.g., R.A. Dahl, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1956); and C.B. MacPherson, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (London: Oxford University Press, 1977).
9 See, e.g., N. Poulantzas, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM (London: New Left
Books, 1978); C. Offe, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE (Cambridge: M.I.T.
Press, 1984).
10 L. Panitch, The Role and Nature of the Canadian State, in L. Panitch, ed.,
THE CANADIAN STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POLITICAL POWER (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1977) at 11.
11 M. Mandel, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS
IN CANADA (Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1989); A. Petter, The Politics of the
Charter (1986) 8 Sup. CT. L. REV. 473.
12 A.C. Cairns, The Limited Constitutional Vision of Meech Lake, in Swinton
and Rogerson, supra, note 2 at 247; A.C. Cairns, Ottawa, The Provinces and Meech
Lake, in Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 105; D. Barrie, Who Spoke for Canada?, in
Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 143; R. Gibbins, A Sense of Unease: The Meech Lake
Accord, in Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 121; W.E Gold, Meech Mumbles, in Gibbins,
supra, note 6 at 147; Schwartz, supra, note 3 at 1-7.
13 Schwartz, ibid. at 1-3.
14 Barrie, supra, note 12 at 144.
1S Gibbins, supra, note 12 at 123.
16 Cairns, in Swinton and Rogerson, supra, note 2 at 248.
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activists, northerners, and those Canadians who are not founding
peoples [should not] be encouraged to sleep soundly and securely when
future first ministers reshuffle, in private, the constitutional relationships
among the governments and peoples of Canada".1 7 The exclusionary
nature of the Meech Lake process was compounded by the presentation
of the Accord as a fait accompli for rubber stamp approval by
provincial legislatures and Parliament. There was no opposition, no
debate, no discussion. As we will see below, many of the authors have
strong reservations about executive federalism. Others believe there is
a place for it in the Canadian political process. Regardless of which
position they take, however, most agree that the Meech Lake process
was an example of executive federalism at its very worst.'s
B. The Entrenchment of First Ministers' Conferences
Commentators who are critical of executive federalism tend to
view the Meech Lake process as a manifestation of its deficiencies.
They are particularly concerned about clauses 8 and 13 of the schedule
to the Accord which would entrench First Ministers' Conferences in
the Constitution.19 Criticisms of entrenching First Ministers' Confer-
ences are based upon two related concerns about executive federalism:
(1) it is elitist and does not allow for sufficient public input and (2) it
shifts power away from legislative assemblies and the House of Com-
mons and into the hands of provincial and federal executives.
17 Ibid. at 249.
18 Gibbins, supra, note 12 at 125; Barrie, supra, note 12 at 143; Schwartz,
supra, note 3 at 5; Cairns, in Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 106; Cairns, in Swinton and
Rogerson, supra, note 2 at 248-50.
Deficiencies in the democratic process are often thought to be compensated for
by the existence of a free press. While politicians might hope to cut their deals in
private, the commitment of the press to finding the facts and reporting them to the
public is understood as ensuring that the public is kept aware of important political
manoeuvers when politicians prefer secrecy. A number of the authors in PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE WEST concentrate on the role of the press in the Meech Lake process.
They point to the failure of the press in compensating for the undemocratic aspects
of the Meech Lake process and provide interesting insight about why this happened.
D. Taras, Meech Lake and Television News, in Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 219;
E. Alboim, Inside the News Story: Meech Lake as Viewed by an Ottawa Bureau
Chief, in Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 235; L. Felske, Fractured Mirror: The Importance
of Region and Personalities in English Language Newspaper Coverage of Meech
Lake, in Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 247.
19 Clause 8 of the schedule to the Meech Lake Accord proposes a new section
148 of the Constitution Act, 1867 which requires that a First Ministers' Conference
be convened by the Prime Minister of Canada at least once a year to discuss the
state of the Canadian economy and such other matters as may be appropriate. Clause
13 of the schedule replaces Part VI of the Constitution Act, 1982, with a requirement
that a First Ministers' Conference be convened by the Prime Minister at least once a
year and must include on its agenda Senate reform and fisheries as well as "such
other matters as are agreed upon".
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1. Executive Federalism and the Absence of Public Input
A number of authors are critical of clauses 8 and 13 of the
schedule to the Accord because of their understanding of executive
federalism as elitist and exclusionary. According to them, the exclusion
of women, aboriginal peoples, social policy activists, northerners and
other Canadians from the Meech Lake process was very much related
to the deficiencies of executive federalism as a political process. 20
Schwartz, for example, states:
Part VI of the proposed Constitution Act, 1987 [which is found in clause
13 of the schedule to the Accord] would only reinforce the tendency of
first ministers to see themselves as members of a miniature constitutional
convention. The constitutional will must intensely reflect the philosophies
and partisan political aims of the eleven leaders, rather than the shared
resolve of Canadians that is crystallized through a sustained period of
serious debate.21
A number of authors have emphasized the "maleness" of executive
federalism,22 and others point out that there is no representation of
aboriginal peoples at First Ministers' Conferences.
With respect to the latter point, clause 13 of the schedule to the
Accord provides no guarantee of aboriginal participation, nor even
input, at First Ministers' Conferences. According to Schwartz even the
most limited representation of aboriginal peoples in First Ministers'
Conferences is unlikely to occur if the provision for First Ministers'
Conferences in the Accord is entrenched:23 Senate reform and fisheries
jurisdiction are mandatory items on the agenda of First Ministers'
Conferences as provided for in the Accord, while aboriginal issues are
not.24 Indeed, the exclusion of aboriginal peoples is even worse than
Schwartz portrays it. Fisheries are after all an aboriginal issue. "It is
incredible", according to Chief Erasmus, "that the First Ministers are
planning to discuss fisheries in the absence of aboriginal people, when
everyone in Canada knows that fishing is an aboriginal right, confirmed
in many treaties, and is an industry in which several first nations
earned their livelihood".25 Without aboriginal participation at future
20 Cairns, in Swinton and Rogerson, supra, note 2.
21 Schwartz, supra, note 3 at 115.
22 D. Greschner, How not to Drown in Meech Lake: Rules, Principles and
Women's Equality Rights, in Swinton and Rogerson, supra, note 2 at 55; Barrie,
supra, note 12.
23 Schwartz, supra, note 3 at 120. Schwartz notes that representation of several
aboriginal leaders at "cozy Meech-like get togethers" would not reflect the ethnic
diversity of aboriginal peoples, nor their commitment to democratic decision-making.
24 Ibid. at 122.
2 G. Erasmus, Native Rights, in Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 182.
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first ministers' meetings, according to Chief Erasmus, there is a
substantial risk "that aboriginal rights, interests, status, and aspirations
[will be] further undermined".26
2. Disempowering the House of Commons and Legislative
Assemblies
Entrenching executive federalism in the Constitution raises con-
cern about "more fait accomplis hammered out away from the elected
assemblies".27 In a political system like ours where rigid party disci-
pline is the rule, to the extent that executive federalism is promoted,
the role of the more open and democratic legislative assemblies and
House of Commons in political decision-making will be weakened. As
Gold puts it:
The institutionalization of First Ministers' meetings on the senate and the
fisheries further establishes the permanency of this undemocratic appara-
tus .... The additional federal provincial machinery thus required will
sooner or later lead to the establishment of a formal First Minister
secretariat. The worst fears of those who have long warned of creation
of yet another level of quasi government, and a nearly unaccountable one
at that,, will be that much closer to fruition.28
Defenders of First Ministers' Conferences emphasize the efficiency of
the process. Both Hogg and Courchene point out, for example, that
first ministers are able to make commitments to each other concerning
executive or legislative action which they are in a position to carry
out because they can "deliver" their legislatures.29 As well, both
authors portray the entrenchment of First Ministers' Conferences in
the Constitution as mere confirmation of an already existing practice.30
The argument that executive federalism is an efficient form of
political decision-making does not, of course, answer the concerns of
those who view it as an attenuation of democracy. It does not tell us
why we should prefer efficiency when it entails curbing participation.
Hogg, for example, begs the question of where to establish the balance
between efficiency and democracy. He notes that "at first blush, the
group [of eleven first ministers] seems to be too small and too narrowly
composed to serve as a constitutional convention". His answer to this
difficulty is, however, unsatisfactory: "The reality is that the evolution
of responsible government in Canada has concentrated extraordinary
power in the hands of these eleven first ministers."31 It is not clear
26 Ibid.
27 T.J. Courchene, Meech Lake and Federalism, in Swinton and Rogerson,
supra, note 2 at 137.
28 Gold, supra, note 12 at 149.
29 Hogg, supra, note 4 at 53; Courchene, supra, note 27 at 139.
30 Hogg, ibid.; Courchene, ibid. at 137-8.
31 Hogg, ibid.
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why this "reality" is desirable, nor why it should be perpetuated
through constitutional entrenchment.
Courchene is similarly unclear on the point. He acknowledges
that increases in the scope of executive federalism necessarily corre-
spond to erosion of the powers of the House of Commons (and,
presumably, provincial legislatures). He then says, "one way of coun-
tering the influence of executive federalism is to move away from
responsible government - hardly an appealing prospect for Canadi-
ans".32 The inference is that executive federalism is somehow a nec-
essary feature of responsible government; that the key to responsible
government is the capacity of first ministers to reach agreements and
deliver their respective legislatures through party discipline. We have
always understood the ideal of responsible government as meaning
something quite different: that, to use Hogg's words, the first minister
(and other members of the executive) "are accountable to their legis-
lative bodies and, ultimately, to their electorates". 33 Courchene appears
to be saying that responsible government requires legislatures be re-
sponsible to executives. Yet this is exactly the antithesis of responsible
government as a democratic ideal.
III. THE DIsTINCT SOCIETY AND LINGUISTIC DUALITY CLAUSES
The undemocratic aspects of the Meech Lake Accord go deeper
than the process leading up to the Accord or its proposals concerning
executive federalism. Indeed, as we shall see, the exclusivity and
elitism of the Meech Lake process is very much reflected in the final
document by its failure to include in a substantial way the concerns
of aboriginal peoples, women and ethnic minorities. This failure is
correctly condemned by a number of authors. We agree with them that
the Accord's exclusion of various groups from constitutional politics
is wrong per se. We will argue, however, that it does not follow from
this that inclusion of provisions reflecting the concerns of these groups
would actually provide them with any concrete benefits. The hallmark
of constitutional politics is to turn complicated and controversial polit-
ical issues into questions about the proper interpretation of abstract
textual prescriptions. The Supreme Court of Canada is then given the
final say on their meaning.34 Thus, a vague constitutional guarantee
provides nothing more than a right to have the legal profession and
judiciary - institutions not known historically for their empathy with
disempowered groups - hammer out a "solution" to a complex
political problem. 35
12 Courchene, supra, note 27 at 139.
33 Hogg, supra, note 4 at 53.
34 Mandel, supra, note 11.
35 Petter, supra, note 11.
1989]
Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa
While one cannot deny the importance of exclusion at the level
of symbolic politics, abstract provisions purporting to include particular
groups in the Constitution will not necessarily go beyond symbolism.
In particular, constitutional recognition of women, aboriginals or ethnic
minorities, if at the same level of abstraction as the Accord's recog-
nition of language duality and Quebec's distinctiveness, would not
necessarily lead to concrete gains for these groups. The proof is,
indeed, in the pudding. As we will argue at the end of this section,
the inclusion of a "distinct society" clause in the Constitution, while
potentially of some symbolic value, will not necessarily function to
advance the historical aspirations of Quebec to promote and preserve
its language and culture and may, indeed, be an impediment to the
realization of those aspirations.
A. The Legalization of the "National Question"
Section 1 of the Meech Lake Accord, if entrenched in the
Constitution, would transform the question of Quebec's distinctiveness
into a legal issue.36 Inclusion of the "distinct society" clause will have
the effect of focussing discussion of the question of Quebec's relation-
ship with the rest of the country on technical questions of construction
and interpretation - the lawyerly search for the truest reading of a
constitutional prescription. Indeed, this has already happened. In place
of the heated and politicized debates about Quebec to which we have
become accustomed, we see commentators raising "fascinating" and
"interesting" questions about how the words of the Accord fit together.
When reading commentaries on Meech Lake one cannot help but
notice the enthusiasm with which lawyers and law professors embrace
36 1. The Constitution Act, 1867 is amended by adding thereto, immedi-
ately after section 1 thereof, the following section:
2. (l)The Constitution of Canada shall be interpreted in a manner
consistent with
(a) the recognition that the existence of French-speaking Canadians
centred in Quebec but also present elsewhere in Canada, and English-
speaking Canadians concentrated outside Quebec but also present in
Quebec, constitutes a fundamental characteristic of Canada; and
(b) the recognition that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct
society.
(2)The role of the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legisla-
tures to preserve the fundamental characteristic of Canada referred to
in paragraph (1) (a) is affirmed.
(3)The role of the legislature and Government of Quebec to preserve
and promote the distinct identity of Quebec referred to in paragraph (1)
(b) is affirmed.
(4)Nothing in this section derogates from the powers, rights or
privileges of Parliament or the Government of Canada, or of the
legislatures or governments of the provinces, including any powers,
rights or privileges relating to language.
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the legalistic challenge presented by section 1 of the Accord. The most
common questions raised relate to the interaction of the distinct society
and linguistic duality clauses with the existing distribution of powers
between federal and provincial governments, and with the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Technically, the relevant provisions enunciate a principle of inter-
pretation for the rest of the Constitution, and then affirm certain "roles"
for federal and provincial governmental and legislative bodies. Many
of the difficulties in the technical/legal debate about section 1 of the
Accord stem from the use of the word "roles". As Woehrling points
out, the assigning of a role is a new approach in Canadian constitutional
law.37 How does a role compare to a legislative power, or to a duty
or obligation? Are the roles new or are they merely declaratory of
existing ones? Do they add to existing legislative powers, or do they
limit the way these powers may be exercised from now on? In the
context of the division of powers, commentators ask whether the
interpretive provisions and affirmed roles, specifically as regards Que-
bec forming a distinct society within Canada, alter the federalism
scheme found in the former Constitution Acts. In particular, because
the Accord was agreed to by Quebec to satisfy its historical aspirations,
should it not acquire new, exclusive and sovereign jurisdiction, at least
in respect to language, culture and social policies? The position among
most of the scholars who address the issue is that section 1 of the
Accord does not modify the existing distribution of powers. Subsection
4 of the proposed section 2 of the Constitution Act, 1987 is relied on
in support of this claim.38 At the same time, however, commentators
appear to agree that "whether or not there is a grant of legislative
power in [the proposed] s. 2, a new interpretive direction will be
added to the Constitution". 39
The question raised concerning the Charter is this: by what criteria
does one resolve a conflict between the requirements of section 1 of
the Accord and those of the Charter? For example, assuming entrench-
ment of the Accord, if the Quebec government exercised its power to
promote the distinctiveness of Quebec by passing a piece of legislation,
would that legislation be subject to the Charter? Or would it be
immune from the Charter because the Constitution Act, 1987 is
subsequent to the Charter?40 Textual support for the view that such
legislation would be immune from the Charter, at least in relation to
37 J. Woehrling, Les clauses de l'Accord relatives a la dualit6 linguistique et
la reconnaisance de Qudbec comme "socidtj distincte", in Forest, supra, note 7 at
16.
38 Woehrling, ibid. at 17-18; Hogg, supra, note 4 at 14-15; but see also
Smith, supra, note 2 at 41, for an opposing viewpoint.
39 Smith, ibid. at 41.
40 See B. Slattery, The Constitutional Priority of the Charter, in Swinton and
Rogerson, supra, note 2 at 86.
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the interests of certain groups, is found by some commentators in
section 16 of the Accord.41 According to that section nothing in section
1 of the Accord affects Charter provisions concerning aboriginal rights
or multiculturalism. Some argue that, by exclusion, all other provisions
of the Charter are not exempt from the operation of section 1 of the
Accord.42 This has raised concern on the part of a number of com-
mentators that the gender equality guarantee of section 15 of the
Charter could be over-ridden by the "distinct society" clause.4a
Others argue that section 1 of the Accord does not take precedence
over the Charter, but can only be relied upon by courts when inter-
preting, under section 1 of the Charter, the reasonableness of limits
on individual rights imposed by Quebec in pursuit of preserving or
promoting its distinctiveness, or by Canada or a province in preserving
linguistic duality. Thus, the Accord would not jeopardize the protection
of Charter rights in Quebec, but would provide for, "un am6nagement
original du r6gime des droits et libert6s qui concorde avec 'la recon-
naissance de ce que le Qu6bec forme au sein du Canada un soci6t6
distincte"'.44 Under this approach, section 16 is merely cautionary,
"designed to reassure native people and other ethnic, linguistic or
cultural communities that the recognition of linguistic duality and
Quebec's distinct society is not inconsistent with the protection of
other distinct communities in Canada". 45
B. The Politics of Exclusion: Aboriginal People, Ethnic Minorities
and Women
The legalistic debate about the distinct society and linguistic
duality clauses is, like many legal debates, ultimately unsatisfying.
There are at least two plausible readings of the relevant clauses; they
are in conflict and, if the Accord is entrenched, the "solution" will be
provided by the Supreme Court of Canada. Notwithstanding the tech-
nical dimensions of the debate around the relationship between the
Accord and the Charter, however, the politics of the Accord are clearly
41 16. Nothing in section 3 of the Constitution Act, 1867 affects section 25 or
27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 or class 24 of section 91 of the Constitution Act,
1867.
42 K.E. Swinton, Competing Visions of Constitutionalism: Of Federalism and
Rights, in Swinton and Rogerson, supra, note 2 at 287.
43 Smith, supra, note 2; Greschner, supra, note 22; K. Mahoney, Women's
Rights, in Gibbins, supra, note 6 at 159; Swinton, ibid.
44 A. Morel, La reconnaisance du Qudbec comme socijtj distincte dans le
respect de la Charte, in Forest, supra, note 7 at 57. See also Slattery, supra, note
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exclusionary. As one commentator states, the significance of Meech
Lake "must be found. . .at the symbolic level".46 And, at this level,
the Accord can be understood as confirmation of the view that the
fundamental structural constituents of Canada's polity are the provinces
and the two linguistic groups, French and English. The "visions"
symbolized by Meech Lake:
[A]re those which relate to the traditional, historic divisions or cleavages
which have shaped Canadian political life. These include relations be-
tween French and English-speaking Canadians, between provincial and
national communities and between federal and provincial governments.
Meech Lake is really about these themes - a resolution of a traditional
and continuing agenda. It is about the pattern of Canadian federalism.47
The message is that Canada is constituted in accordance with the
limited framework inherent in the traditional view.
The framework is exclusionary by definition. Within it, there is
little room for claims that do not fit the traditional federalism scheme
to be articulated and addressed. At the highest level of political
ordering, the Canadian community is defined in narrow and limited
terms. The Accord provides a framework that constitutes Canada solely
in terms of provincial units and ethnic duality representing the two
colonial powers. This has the effect of making invisible, for constitu-
tional purposes, aboriginal peoples and ethnic communities other than
those representing the colonial powers, as well as any other groups,
including women. Section 1 of the Accord symbolizes, through that
which it excludes, that Canada is to be defined exclusively from the
perspective of the heirs of the European imperial powers who colonized
it. That is nothing short of an outrage for aboriginal peoples who were
here long before the French and English arrived, and who were victims
of French and English imperialism, and it is a profound insult to ethnic
communities who are neither English nor French.
Chief George Erasmus, National Chief of the Assembly of First
Nations, develops this point in the context of the concerns of aboriginal
peoples:
[T]he express recognition of Quebec as a distinct society] perpetuates the
idea of a duality in Canada, -nd strengthens the myth that the French
and the English peoples are the foundations of Canada. It neglects the
original inhabitants and distorts history. . . . The amendment fails to give
explicit constitutional recognition to the existence of First Nations as
distinct societies that also form a fundamental characteristic of Canada.48
46 I. Bernier, Meech Lake and Constitutional Visions, in Swinton and Roger-
son, supra, note 2 at 243.
47 R. Simeon, Meech Lake and Visions of Canada, in Swinton and Rogerson,
supra, note 2 at 300.
43 Erasmus, supra, note 25 at 180.
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It is, indeed, inexcusable that aboriginal peoples are not included in a
provision purporting to state the fundamental ethnic characteristics of
Canada. Chamberlain points out that, while the exclusion of aboriginal
people from the Constitution is not a new phenomenon, such exclusion
is given "menacing constitutional encouragement" when in the context
of a provision aimed at defining the fundaments of Canada.49 Ulti-
mately, in Chamberlain's view, "the distinct society provision will
diminish constitutional tolerance for effective expressions of aboriginal
sovereignty, and distort constitutional acknowledgement of aboriginal
rights".50
The timing of the Meech Lake Accord adds insult to injury for
aboriginal peoples. As Schwartz points out, the Accord was signed
only months after the last constitutionally required First Ministers'
Conference on aboriginal peoples at which no agreement was reached
on entrenching a right to self-government for aboriginal people.51 Chief
Erasmus notes; "We were told for five years that governments are
reluctant to entrench undefined self-government of aboriginal people
in the Constitution, yet there is an equally vague idea of distinct
society, unanimously agreed to and allowed to be left to the courts for
interpretation."52 Parts of the Accord may actually function to impede
the struggle for aboriginal self-government by making it nearly impos-
sible for the Yukon and Northwest Territories to achieve provincial
status.53 Within this wider context of exclusion, section 16 of the
Accord is hardly an adequate reassurance for aboriginal peoples. Chief
Erasmus notes that, "this was the barest minimum that the aboriginal
leaders had advocated, and the fact that we got the bare minimum
seems to reflect the attitude of First Ministers to do the bare minimum
in dealing with the rights of aboriginal people".54
The exclusionary framework of the Accord operates against other
groups as well. With respect to ethnicity, for example, the section 16
protection of the multiculturalism provision of the Charter is not
reassuring when the whole framework of the Accord is exclusionary.
Whyte points out that, in constitutionalizing ethnic duality, the Accord
"produces a shift away from ethnic accommodation more profoundly
understood".55 The restrictive framework of the Accord is, for Whyte,
a lost opportunity for "visioning our future":56 "The political values
of tolerance, adaptation, accommodation, celebration of diversity and
49 J.E. Chamberlain, Aboriginal Rights and the Meech Lake Accord, in Swin-
ton and Rogerson, supra, note 2 at 12.
50 Ibid. at 14.
51 Schwartz, supra, note 3 at 56.
52 Erasmus, supra, note 25 at 180.
53 See clauses 9 to 12 of the schedule to the Accord. Erasmus, ibid. at 183.
54 Erasmus, ibid. at 179. See also Schwartz, supra, note 3 at 52.
55 J.D. Whyte, The 1987 Constitutional Accord and Ethnic Accommodation,
in Swinton and Rogerson, supra, note 2 at 266.
56 Ibid. at 269.
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promotion of the worth of difference are not represented in the Meech
Lake agreement. The fundamental restructuring of the state that has
taken place in the Meech Lake process seems to be sadly anomalous
and out-of-date." 57
The reasons for dissatisfaction with the Accord include, as we
have seen, concerns about women's equality claims under section 15
of the Charter being subordinated by the courts in the name of
Quebec's promotion of its distinctiveness or Canadian protection of
linguistic duality in accordance with section 1 of the Accord. There is
an important difficulty with this concern: its plausibility depends on
the courts actually interpreting the Charter's guarantee of gender
equality to advance the equality claims of women, something they
have not yet done in any substantial way.5 8 Feminist concerns, however,
go further than the technical/legal issues and may be better understood
at the symbolic level. If the Accord is saying that Quebec's distinc-
tiveness and Canadian linguistic duality are more fundamental and
important than women's equality claims, this is a disturbing message.
In this sense there may be an analogy between the position of women
and that of aboriginal peoples and ethnic communities. The distinct
society and linguistic duality clauses imply that women as a group are
not a fundamental constituent of the Canadian political community. In
other words, the traditional federalism framework of the Accord ex-
cludes women as a group from constitutional politics by including only
provinces and language groups. Thus, the problem is not confined to
the issue of whether the actual Charter rights of women are overridden.
Rather, it extends to the fact that the group identity of women is given
no recognition as having a place in the constitutional community.59
C. The Politics of Inclusion: Quebec as a Distinct Society
The Accord's exclusionary politics are to be regrettable. The
message that various groups are excluded from constitutional politics
runs counter to the democratic emphasis on enhancing participation in
the governmental process, and it is a profound insult to the excluded
groups. On the other hand, it is important to realize that while
exclusion is undesirable per se, it does not follow that a mere formal
and abstract inclusion of the excluded groups would necessarily provide
anything more than symbolic and rhetorical recognition. There is
always a large gap between the vague guarantees provided in a
constitutional document and the concrete benefits to the supposed
beneficiaries of the guarantees. Women fought long and hard for the
57 Ibid. at 268.
58 See J. Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction: The Possibilities of and the
Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles (1987) 25
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 485; Mandel, supra, note 11 at 256-73.
59 Swinton, supra, note 42 at 284; Whyte, supra, note 55 at 264-65.
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guarantee of sex equality in section 15 of the Charter, yet, to this
point, there has been little to celebrate from the perspective of women's
equality claims in judicial interpretations of section 15. 60 In a similar
vein, recognition in the Accord of a place in the constitutional frame-
work for excluded groups similar to the recognition of Quebec's
distinctiveness, while no doubt of immense symbolic importance,
would not necessarily translate into concrete gains for these groups.
Indeed, the "distinct society" provision is itself an example of
the gap between abstract constitutional recognition of a group's place
in the Constitution and the actual promotion of that group's claims.
The distinct society clause superficially appears to end the passionate
political struggle around Quebec nationalism by turning it into a legal
debate about the correct interpretation of a vague constitutional pro-
vision. The issue is apparently resolved by removing it from the hands
of Quebeckers (who were at least given a say in the 1980 Referendum)
and into those of federally appointed judges. Concerns about the
potential erosion and attenuation of Quebec's socioeconomic, linguistic
and cultural distinctiveness are not, however, necessarily met by the
vague and ambiguous recognition of Quebec as a distinct society.
There are very few who deny that Quebec is a distinct society. The
question of what exactly that means in terms of the relative powers of
Quebec, the other provinces and the federal government, however, is
not answered by the constitutional labelling of Quebec as a distinct
society. The "distinct society" clause has more to do with who can
decide what Quebec's distinctiveness means than with the question of
whether Quebec is a distinct society. In short, it empowers the Supreme
Court of Canada to provide the ultimate definition of what it means
for Quebec to be distinct. And this is unlikely to advance Quebec's
aspirations given the several examples of that Court's ambivalence
toward any substantial and concrete manifestations of those aspira-
tions.61
At the end of the day, while the distinct society clause may have
a "great symbolic value", 62 it is unlikely to advance in any significant
way Quebec's historical aspirations. The clause guarantees nothing of
a concrete nature for Quebec, yet it has been taken in exchange for
Quebec's consent to the Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, the symbolic
value of the distinct society provision may, in the absence of concrete
guarantees of cultural and linguistic autonomy, turn out to be an
impediment to the securing of such autonomy.
Sociologists of law often speak of the ideological function of
abstract legal ideals in legitimating realities that are far removed from
those ideals. The process is referred to as reification. The distinction
60 Supra, note 58.
61 See Mandel, supra, note 11 at 90-127.
62 R. Gibbins, Introduction: Meech Lake and Quebec, in Gibbins, supra, note
6 at 64.
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between the actual web of social relations in which people live and
the legal idealization of the world is collapsed. The social situation of
people is portrayed in terms of some abstract legal ideal and considered
as justified on that basis. 63 The granting of a formal legal guarantee
of Quebec's distinctiveness in the Meech Lake Accord may function
in the future to legitimate denying Quebec the actual power to preserve
and promote its distinctiveness. The historic struggle of Quebeckers to
preserve and promote a distinct society will be portrayed as having
been fought and won: resolved through the granting to Quebec of a
constitutional guarantee. In light of this, further complaints, protests
and actions by the government and/or people of Quebec will be deemed
illegitimate to the extent that they go further than the content of the
constitutional guarantee of distinctiveness as determined by the Su-
preme Court of Canada. In light of the restrictive language of the
Accord and the Supreme Court of Canada's several indications of
commitment to minority language rights in Quebec, it is unlikely that
that content will amount to very much from Quebec's perspective. 64
In short, the formal guarantee of distinctiveness for Quebec will be
relied on to delegitimate the continued struggle on Quebec's part;
while, as a matter of substance, Quebec may gain nothing.
63 See, e.g., S. Picotto, The Theory of the State, Class Struggle and the Rule
of Law, in P. Beirne and R. Quinney, eds, MARXISM AND LAW (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1982); A. Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in
Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law (1985) 19
LAW & Soc. REV. 11; C. Sumner, READING IDEOLOGIES (London: Academic Press,
1979) at 267-77.
6 Mandel, supra, note 11 at 88.
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